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THE SIREN SONG OF
LITIGATION FUNDING
J.B. Heaton *

For an investor, litigation funding is too tempting to resist. Litigation
funding promises that most elusive of investment returns: those uncorrelated
with an investor’s other investment returns. Litigation funding also invests in
a world that seems fraught with possible pricing inefficiencies. It seems
plausible—even likely—that a team of smart lawyer-underwriters can identify
high-value litigation investments to generate superior returns for litigationfunding investors. But more than a decade of experience suggests the promise
of litigation funding is a siren song. The promise draws investors into the
water, but the payoffs may be meager and rare. While litigation funding has
always been controversial with defendants and business trade associations, the
real problem is that the investment class is a poor one. First, high-stakes civil
litigation is far more complex and random than most investors understand.
There are an overwhelming number of ways that litigants can lose and far
fewer paths to significant victories. Second, few good cases—from an
investment perspective—are likely to find their way to funders. Third,
litigation funding is probably prone to optimism bias, causing litigation
funders to overestimate the probability of victory in their cases. Finally,
litigation funding is fungible with little value added by the funder, suggesting
that competition will drive down any significant previously-existing profits.
While litigation funding serves a valuable social purpose when it finances
meritorious cases that otherwise would not be pursued, we can expect investor
success in the field to be rare and likely limited to those funders with the most
litigation savvy and the best luck. Nevertheless, investors are unlikely to give
up on the space despite the large prospect of poor returns.

*

J.B. Heaton, P.C., Chicago, Illinois, jb@jbheaton.com. Many thanks to a litigation
funder and hedge fund manager, who will remain anonymous, for help in understanding the pitfalls
of the litigation funding business. Thanks also to Ronen Avraham, Tony Sebok, and Steve Shavell
for helpful comments. Additional thanks to my former colleagues at Bartlit Beck LLP for almost
two decades of lessons in the conduct and uncertainties of civil litigation. All errors are my own.
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Alas
it is a boring song
but it works every time.
- Margaret Atwood, Siren Song (1974).

I. INTRODUCTION
No aspect of litigation is more controversial than litigation funding. 1
Litigation funding is the non-recourse financing of a party’s litigation expenses
by a third-party funder. A Law360 poll found that while 86% of attorneys who
have used litigation funding report a positive opinion of it, 62% of in-house
counsel—perhaps more likely to be on the other side of a funded case—report a
negative opinion. 2 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce remains actively opposed
to litigation funding, favoring state legislative efforts to force plaintiffs to
disclose their litigation funding arrangements as part of initial discovery

1. In this Comment, I analyze so-called “commercial litigation finance,” the financing of
non-consumer litigation. The financing of consumer litigation presents different issues than those
analyzed here. For a thorough treatment of consumer litigation finance with empirical results, see
Ronen Avraham and Anthony J. Sebok, An Empirical Investigation of Third Party Consumer
Litigation Funding, 104 Cornell L. Rev. 1133 (2019).
2. Cristina Violante, What Your Colleagues Think of Litigation Finance, LAW360 (Dec. 11,
2017, 9:45 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/989204/what-your-colleagues-think-of-litigationfinance.
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disclosures in a case. 3 Some judges require plaintiffs to disclose their litigation
funding arrangements to the court. 4
We think of the litigation funding arrangement as solving two problems.
First, litigation funding is a form of financing. Like a contingency-fee
arrangement, the litigation funding arrangement provides financing that may
allow a budget-constrained plaintiff to finance litigation that she would
otherwise be unable to pursue. 5 It may also allow a plaintiff that is not budget
constrained to finance litigation without tapping other available cash, using that
cash for other purposes. 6 Second, litigation funding is a risk-transfer
mechanism. The non-recourse nature of most litigation funding allows the
litigant to protect the downside of a loss by trading to the funder more of the
potential gains from a win.
While much has been written about litigation funding, 7 research has more or
less assumed that litigation funding makes sense for investors, focusing instead

3. See Third Party Litigation Funding (TPLF), INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM,
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/third-party-litigation-funding (last visited Sept. 15,
2019) (“The practice, while lucrative for those betting on cases, increases the probability that
meritless claims will be brought, inserts questions about who is actually controlling the litigation
other than the plaintiff and defendant, and makes settling lawsuits far more difficult and expensive.
Even the funders admit they deliberately complicate litigation.”); Andrew Strickler, Legal Funders,
US Chamber Weigh In on NYC Bar Study, LAW360 (June 4, 2019, 9:50 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1165924/legal-funders-us-chamber-weigh-in-on-nyc-bar-study.
4. See Jeff Overley, Opioid MDL Attys Must Disclose Outside Funding, Judge Says,
LAW360 (May 7, 2018, 8:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1041305/opioid-mdl-attysmust-disclose-outside-funding-judge-says (reporting on an order by U.S. District Court Judge Aaron
Polster requiring plaintiffs’ attorneys to disclose litigation funding arrangements to the court);
Andrew Strickler, 3rd-Party Funders Must Be Disclosed in 6 Fed. Appeals Courts, LAW360 (Mar.
27, 2018, 8:30 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1026646/3rd-party-funders-must-bedisclosed-in-6-fed-appeals-courts (reporting that six U.S. federal appeals courts require some
disclosure of litigation funders in civil disputes, while 24 U.S. district courts have a requirement that
funders be disclosed to the court); e.g., FastShip, LLC v. United States, 143 Fed. Cl. 700, 717
(2019) (“Like the patent system as a whole, litigation financing agreements can occasionally be
susceptible to abuse . . . . But the possibility of abuse does not mean the entire system should be
discarded. Instead, courts have focused on the disclosure of such agreements to encourage
transparency . . . .”).
5. See, e.g., Shayna Posses, Woodsford Litigation Funding Launches Tel Aviv Office,
LAW360 (Mar. 28, 2019, 1:17 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1142363/woodsfordlitigation-funding-launches-tel-aviv-office (quoting funder’s chief executive officer as stating:
“[Israel] has a high volume of [venture capital]-backed, high-tech startups that are rich in
intellectual property but limited financial resources. These businesses often find themselves in
dispute with U.S. and European giants, for example patent or trade secrets disputes.”).
6. E.g., Caroline Simson, 3rd-Party Funding Now a Top Alternative Choice for Lawyers,
LAW360 (May 16, 2019, 7:24 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1160547/3rd-party-fundingnow-a-top-alternative-choice-for-lawyers (“Funding is also being used by commercial parties that
have the funds to pay for arbitration or litigation but would like to save their capital for other
uses.”).
7. An early article is George Steven Swan, Economics and the Litigation Funding Industry:
How Much Justice Can You Afford?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805 (2001). The literature is now large.
See, e.g., David S. Abrams and Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First Empirical Look at
Third Party Litigation Funding, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075 (2013); Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation
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on the social benefits and costs of investor funding. This Article argues that the
assumption that litigation funding is an attractive investment class is wrong.
Recent short-seller criticisms of one of the largest litigation funders have
focused attention on whether the investment success by existing litigation
funding firms are is as good as claimed. 8 I argue here that the promise of
litigation funding is a siren song, luring investors with promises that few other
investment products can make. The promise draws investors into the water, so
to speak, but the ultimate payoffs are meagre and rare. Thus, while litigation
funding has always been controversial with defendants and their trade
associations, the real problem is that the investment class is a poor one.
Part I explains the allure of litigation funding from an investor’s
perspective. It introduces some basic investment theory and explains the
difficulty of earning superior risk-adjusted returns in an efficient market.
Part II explains why the assumption that litigation funding is an attractive
investment opportunity is largely incorrect. While the headlines seem filled
with stories of enormous judgments and settlements and total legal spending is
in the many billions of dollars, more than a decade of experience with litigation
funding suggests that its investment promise is an empty one. First, litigation is
far more complex and random than most investors understand. Second, only a
small subset of meritorious litigation is likely to present itself to funders. Third,
litigation funding is probably prone to optimism bias, causing litigation funders
to overestimate the probability of victory in their cases. Finally, litigation
funding is fungible with little value added by the funder, suggesting that
competition will drive down any significant profits that have existed in the
business previously.
Part III explores the consequences of what will likely be the poor
performance of litigation funding. There is good reason to believe that some
litigation funding is socially beneficial because it allows risk-averse plaintiffs to
pursue meritorious cases they would otherwise forego because of their risk
aversion or inability to fund the litigation. Litigation funding is especially
important in allowing meritorious cases to move forward when litigants are
otherwise unable to bear the costs and the risks of vindicating their rights. This
is especially true against large corporations that have the ability to outspend
even wealthy individuals. If litigation funding ultimately proves itself to be a

Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65 (2010); Jonathan T. Molot,
The Feasibility of Litigation Markets, 89 IND. L.J. 171 (2014); Douglas R. Richmond, Other
People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56 MERCER L. REV. 649 (2005); Anthony J.
Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61 (2011); Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This
Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011); Maya Steinitz, The
Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455 (2012); Maya Steinitz, How Much Is
That Lawsuit in the Window? Pricing Legal Claims, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1889 (2013).
8. See Margot Patrick, Short-Seller Accuses Litigation-Finance Firm Burford Capital of
‘Meaningless Metrics,’ WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2019, 7:51 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/muddy-waters-claim-sees-shares-in-litigation-finance-firm-tumble-11565178688?mod=
searchresults&page=1&pos=7.
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poor investment class, will litigants be unable to pursue these meritorious
cases?
The poor performance of litigation funding is unlikely to keep investors
away. Financial economists are coming to understand more and more that
investors value lottery-like payoffs more than standard models of risk averse
economic agents would suggest. Thus, while a majority of publicly traded
common stocks earn less than the one-month Treasury bill rate over their lives,
investors still flock to invest in stocks in the apparent belief that their stock
picks will be the ones to do well. Some funders will—by dint of substantial
litigation savvy combined with luck—do well in the space, so there will likely
always be funds available to finance litigation with high potential payoffs to the
funder. Thus, as in other areas of investment, investor irrationality or lotterylike preferences (or irrationality that results in lottery-like preferences) will
likely continue to make funding available, generating social benefits for
litigants while laying off the private costs of sub-par investment performance on
the litigation funder’s investors.
II. THE PROMISE OF INVESTING IN LITIGATION
A. Low Correlation with Other Investment Returns
Portfolio theory teaches that diversification can maintain the expected
return of a portfolio while also reducing its risk. 9 The key insight of portfolio
theory is that the risk of any single investment in an investor’s portfolio is
determined almost entirely by its covariance with the returns of other
investments in the portfolio rather than the variance of its own returns. 10
Covariance is simply a measure of the tendency of variables to move together or
not. A portfolio benefits when an asset’s returns have low covariances with
other investment returns because the asset’s returns are not high when the other
returns are high or low when the returns are low. Low covariances tend to force
the likely portfolio to return toward its expected value, reducing dispersion
around that expected value. Put simply, low covariances can make it more
likely that the expected return—or something close to it—is the actual return
earned by the portfolio. The covariance of two variables divided by the product
of the standard deviations of those variables is the familiar “correlation
coefficient,” a number between -1 (perfect negative correlation) and +1 (perfect
positive correlation). A correlation of 0 reflects no linear relationship between
the two variables. When investment returns have a high positive correlation,
they tend to move in the same direction and the same time. Consider an
investor who holds Microsoft and Amazon.com stock. The correlation of the

9. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952); A.D. Roy, Safety First
and the Holding of Assets, 20 ECONOMETRICA 431 (1952).
10. Id.
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daily returns on those stocks over the last two years is about 0.76 as of August
16, 2019. 11 This means that Microsoft offers only limited diversification to a
position in Amazon.com, and vice versa. This is fine when returns are good,
but troublesome when returns are bad.
Covariance underlies all modern asset pricing models, including the Capital
Asset Pricing Model, known as the CAPM (pronounced “cap M”). 12 In the
CAPM, risk is measured by “Beta,” which is the covariance of the returns of an
asset with the return on the market of all assets, divided by the variance of the
market return. Securities that have returns that tend to be high when market
returns are high—that is, those with large positive covariances—are riskier (in
the sense of the CAPM) because they tend to fall when the market is falling and
rise when the market is rising. An investor would prefer, all else equal, to have
returns that are high when the market return is low, because this acts as a sort of
insurance policy that pays off when money is otherwise tight because market
returns are low. For institutional investors and very wealthy individuals,
investments that are uncorrelated with other returns are especially valuable. In
the world of institutional investment and high-net worth investing, low
correlation—especially with stock market returns—is a sort of Holy Grail.
Litigation funding promises exactly this sort of low-correlation investment
opportunity. 13 The reason is easy to see. Litigation pays off when a defendant
pays a settlement or satisfies a judgment against it. The timing of such
payments has little to do with the ups and downs of the stock market. There
may be some correlation, of course, if a defendant is more able to satisfy a
judgment when times in the general economy are good than when times are bad,
but that sort of correlation is likely to be very low. Interestingly, if litigation
investments have zero correlation with market returns, then the proper
benchmark rate for such investments is the risk-free rate. This makes sense
because such investments—in a CAPM world—have no risk that is “priced,”
that is, covariant with the market return. Essentially, assets whose returns have
zero correlation with an investor’s other asset returns are very valuable and do
not require much discounting.

11. Data from Bloomberg LLP. I obtained the prices for Amazon.com and Microsoft and
calculate returns from August 17, 2017 to August 16, 2019. I then calculated the correlation
coefficient.
12. The CAPM was worked out theoretically in the early 1960s. See William F. Sharpe,
Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425
(1964); John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock
Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. STAT. 13 (1965); Jan Mossin, Equilibrium in a
Capital Asset Market, 34 ECONOMETRICA 768 (1966); Jack L. Treynor, Toward a Theory of Market
Value of Risky Assets, in Robert A. Korajczyk, ASSET PRICING AND PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE
(1999) (paper circulated in the early 1960s but published only much later).
13. See, e.g., Alan Guy, 2019 Will Bring More Good News for Litigation Finance, LAW360
(Jan. 2, 2019, 3:21 PM) https://www.law360.com/articles/1114147/2019-will-bring-more-goodnews-for-litigation-finance (“Publicity regarding recent nine-figure fund raises by established
funders and the appeal of investing in uncorrelated assets during a period of market volatility are
likely to drive additional capital into the market in the coming year.”).
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B. Potential Market Inefficiencies
The likely low correlation of litigation funding returns with other
investment returns would be a sufficient reason for many investors to consider
investing, but litigation funding has another enticing promise: the prospect of
earning superior, risk-adjusted returns by finding and exploiting mispricing.
This is in stark contrast to the publicly traded equities market where it has
become increasingly implausible for investment managers to beat the market
with any reliability. The first well-known study of the ability of professionals
to find mispriced securities was by Alfred Cowles, published in 1933 in
Econometrica. 14 Cowles found that “the most successful records are little, if
any, better than what might be expected to result from pure chance.”
Additional tests began in earnest in the mid-1960s. For example, in 1966
Professor William F. Sharpe, who would go on to share the Nobel Prize in
Economics for the development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, published
Mutual Fund Performance, 15 finding support for “the view that the capital
market is highly efficient and that good [mutual fund] managers concentrate on
evaluating risk and providing diversification, spending little effort (and money)
on the search for incorrectly priced securities.” 16 In his 1968 study, 17 Professor
Michael C. Jensen found similar evidence. Over subsequent decades, evidence
has mounted against the notion that active investors beat the apparently efficient
securities markets. This inability of professional money managers to beat
passive benchmarks is, for many, highly persuasive evidence of market
efficiency in the pricing of publicly traded securities. 18
Litigation investments are not subject to the same forces that drive the
prices of most publicly traded securities to informationally-efficient levels.
Market efficiency depends mainly on the relevant market being free and open in
the sense that investors can buy and sell without substantial restrictions on
participation like substantial lockups of potential sellers or bans on short selling.
Litigation investments are not traded in such a free and open market. Therefore,

14. Alfred Cowles, Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast?, 1 ECONOMETRICA 309 (1933).
15. William F. Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J. BUS. 119 (1966).
16. Id. at 138.
17. Michael C. Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964, 23 J.
FIN. 389 (1968).
18. See, e.g., Stanley J. Kon & Frank C. Jen, The Investment Performance of Mutual Funds:
An Empirical Investigation of Timing, Selectivity, and Market Efficiency, 52 J. BUS. 263, 263 (1979)
(observing that Jensen’s mutual fund studies “have been cited as support for the strong form of the
Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH); that is, whether any investor has monopolistic access to any
information relevant for price formation.”); Eugene F. Fama, Two Pillars of Asset Pricing, 104 AM.
ECON. REV. 1467, 1482 (2014) (“However one judges market efficiency, it has motivated a massive
body of empirical work that has enhanced our understanding of markets, and, like it or not,
professional money managers have to address its challenges.”).
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litigation funders could possibly make investments that generate superior riskadjusted returns. 19
C. Easy Money
Given the promise of litigation funding as an investment, litigation funders
have unsurprisingly had an easy time raising money. In 2013, one such firm
was able to raise $300 million in less than a year. 20 Two years later, the fund
had more than $1.4 billion under management. 21 By the end of that year, the
litigation fund sold out to a large publicly traded funder, Burford Capital, for
$160 million, or more than 10% of assets under management. 22 In 2018, a startup litigation fund founded by a veteran of one the largest funds, Bentham IMF,
raised $250 million. 23 Another fund reported raising $125 million, which
included “$100 million through university endowments, $50 million from the
University of Michigan, with the rest coming from various funds and high-networth individuals.” 24 Harvard University’s endowment is a large investor in
litigation funding. 25
These figures suggest that the lure of litigation funding is strong. Litigation
funders have been able to raise funds at a time when, for example, hedge fund

19. Burford Interim Report 2019, Burford Capital, https://www.burfordcapital.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/BUR-32541-Interim-Report-2019-WEB.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2019)
(“It is also important to bear in mind that the complexity and illiquidity of legal finance assets is
precisely what gives Burford its edge and its historic ability to generate desirable returns. If
litigation assets were easy to value, the economics of our business would be very different.”).
20. See Andrew Strickler, Attys, CFOs More Open to Litigation Finance, Survey
Finds, LAW360 (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/501563/attys-cfos-more-open-tolitigation-finance-survey-finds (“In April, a new player in the industry, Chicago-based Gerchen
Keller Capital LLC, announced it had raised more than $100 million in three months and was set to
back their first cases. On Monday, Gerchen Keller said they had raised a second fund and had
about $300 million under management.”).
21. See Andrew Strickler, Litigation Backer Gerchen Keller Tops $1B with New Fund,
LAW360 (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/743219/litigation-backer-gerchen-kellertops-1b-with-new-fund (“The Chicago-based Gerchen Keller, which claims to be the world’s largest
investor focused on litigation and regulatory matters, said its new fund brings its total assets under
management north of $1.4 billion.”).
22. See Benjamin Horney, Burford’s $160M GKC Buy Creates Litigation Funding Giant,
LAW360 (Dec. 14, 2016, 5:50PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/872631/burford-s-160m-gkcbuy-creates-litigation-funding-giant.
23. See Andrew Strickler, Litigation Funder Validity Poaches Pair from Bentham IMF, LAW
360 (Dec. 4, 2018, 3:25 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1107944/litigation-funder-validitypoaches-pair-from-bentham-imf (reporting on fund’s starting capital).
24. Darcy Redden, Lake Whillans Closes $125 Million Litigation Funding Round, LAW360
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/998726/lake-whillans-closes-125m-litigationfunding-round.
25. See Michael McDonald, Harvard Invests in Litigation Strategy That Has Posted Big
Gains, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0626/harvard-invests-in-litigation-strategy-that-has-posted-big-gains (describing Harvard’s investment
in fund raises by IMF Bentham).
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managers operating in the public stock markets have been experiencing
withdrawals and closing while new funds have difficulty raising capital. In
contrast, litigation funding is not yet a winner-takes-all market, at least in terms
of fund-raising. Investors appear to believe that the asset class is attractive and
that there is no shortage of talent able to earn superior, risk-adjusted returns.
But there are reasons to be skeptical.
III THE PERILS OF INVESTING IN LITIGATION
A. The Complexity of High-Stakes Civil Litigation
High-stakes civil litigation can seem like a simple matter of win or lose, but
the process is extraordinarily complex. 26 Economic models often present
litigation as involving a simple comparison of the probability of a plaintiff’s
victory as the plaintiff perceives it, Pp, the judgment that the plaintiff will win if
victorious, J, the cost of litigation for the plaintiff, Cp, 27 the probability of a
plaintiff’s victory as the defendant perceives it, Pd, and the cost of litigation for
the defendant, Cd. 28 There is then a simple inequality that implies that the
plaintiff will settle the case if:
Pp J - Cp < Pd J + Cd

That is, the case should settle if the risk neutral plaintiff’s expected gain
from litigating is less than the risk neutral defendant’s expected loss. Further,
the case should settle somewhere in the range of those two amounts. Cases
should always settle if the parties agree on J and P, because the plaintiff’s costs
are a reduction from her expected gain (forcing the left side of the equation
down) and the defendant’s costs are an addition to his expected loss (forcing the
right side of the equation up). If the inequality is reversed:
Pp J - Cp > Pd J + Cd

then the case will go trial.
This simple model of litigation can generate a number of insights, but it is
simplistic to the point of absurdity in light of the complexity of real-world
litigation. The probability of victory is not so easily determined. The classical

26. Surprisingly, little research addresses the problem of complexity and litigation
prediction. Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283 (2011) provides an
exception. Some attempts to frame the problem are quite simplistic. See, e.g., Michaela Keet,
Litigation Risk Assessment: A Tool to Enhance Negotiation, 19 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 17
(2017).
27. Costs include legal fees, discovery costs, trial exhibits, travel expenses, expert witness
fees, court costs, etc., but exclude costs that are not out-of-pocket like the opportunity costs of time
and attention given to the litigation.
28. The classical models were developed in the early 1970s. See John P. Gould, The
Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); William R. Landes, An Economic
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
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model treats the litigation outcome almost as a coin toss, with a certain
probability P of coming up “victory” and a probability 1-P of coming up
“defeat.” In the real world, there are a multitude of variables that make it
difficult to estimate P. Put differently, the decision tree for real world litigation
is profoundly complex.
Consider a very simple case where there is a single cause of action with four
elements that the plaintiff must establish to win her case. One of those elements
is the existence and amount of damages, which effectively makes for a fiveelement case. When the plaintiff files her case, she must allege each of the
elements of her claim in satisfaction of the required pleading standard.
Assuming that the amount of damages need not be pled, there are four elements
that must be pled in accordance with the relevant pleading standards. There are
15 ways to get past this stage for the plaintiff. First is to adequately plead each
of the 4 elements and proceed to discovery (assuming that we are in a
jurisdiction like the federal courts where no immediate appeal is available for
denial of a motion to dismiss, and not in a state like New York where
interlocutory appeals of most every ruling are available). Second is to fail to
plead any of the four elements (1 possibility) adequately according to the trial
court’s decision but to obtain a full reversal of that decision on appeal. Third is
to fail to plead three of the four elements (4 possibilities) but to obtain a full
reversal of that decision on appeal. Fourth is to fail to plead two of the four
elements (6 possibilities) but to obtain a full reversal of that decision on appeal.
Fifth is to fail to plead one of the four elements (4 possibilities) but to obtain a
full reversal of that decision on appeal.
Against these 15 ways to get past a motion to dismiss, there are 65 ways to
lose. First, the plaintiff could fail to plead any of the elements in the view of the
trial court. There is one way to fail to plead all the elements. On appeal, the
trial court could be upheld as to all the elements (1 possibility), upheld as to any
three of the elements (4 possibilities), upheld as to any two of the elements (6
possibilities), or upheld as to any one of the elements (4 possibilities). There
are then 15 ways to lose the motion to dismiss when the trial court finds no
element to be adequately alleged. With a trial court finding that are there three
elements inadequately alleged, there are 28 ways to lose, 29 with two elements
inadequately alleged, there are 18 ways to lose, 30 and with one element
inadequately alleged there are 4 ways to lose: the determination as to that one
element (of which there are four possibilities) is affirmed on appeal. Thus, the
motion to dismiss and possible appeal alone generates 80 possible outcomes.

29. There are 4 ways to fail to plead 3 elements at the trial court level. For each of these, the
appellate court can affirm on all three elements (1 possibility), affirm on two of the three elements
(3 possibilities), or affirm on any one of the three possibilities (3 possibilities). Thus, there are 4 x 7
= 28 ways to lose when failing to plead three elements.
30. There are 6 ways to fail to plead 2 elements at the trial court level. For each of these, the
appellate court can affirm on both elements (1 possibility) or on either one of the two elements (2
possibilities). Thus, there are 6 x 3 = 18 ways to lose when failing to plead two elements.
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Matters get worse from there. Once discovery begins, there are a practically
unknowable number of ways that evidence can present itself in the form of
documents (including emails), the deposition testimony of fact witnesses
(parties and nonparties), and the depositions and reports of expert witnesses. 31
At the onset of a case, it is essentially impossible to determine what the set of
evidence will look like at the close of fact and expert discovery. But that set of
evidence largely determines the probabilities of the paths for either getting
stopped at summary judgment 32 or proceeding to trial. Assuming we have the
four-element claim with the amount of damages to be proven at trial, there are
now another 80 paths, 15 of which get past summary judgment (in some cases
after appeal), and 65 of which end the case after an unsuccessful appeal. For
the paths that get past summary judgment to trial, we have the same number of
paths, but now with the added range of damages numbers that might be awarded
by the judge or jury. In addition, the standards of review on appeal change at
the summary judgment and post-trial stages for some matters decided by the
fact-finder.
Now consider that our example concerned a single cause of action with four
elements. Most high-stakes civil cases have multiple counts. 33 Each of those
cases has the same nature of complexity, including—perhaps most
importantly—how discovery unfolds once the case has passed the initial
pleading hurdles. It is extremely difficult for even the most seasoned and
experienced litigators to even roughly judge the chance of victory in a case.
The probability that a litigation funder’s underwriter can do so is quite low.
B. Good Cases are Hard to Find
There are many meritorious cases in the world. The litigation funder’s
problem is to find the subset of meritorious cases that make sense as
investments. That is no easy task.
First, a significant problem in litigation funding is the difficulty of scaling
up an investment in a good case. Litigation funders can, in some circumstances,
buy a direct participation in a claim, but most limit their investment to funding
the costs of litigation. But even a large litigation can only generate so much
expense. A litigation funder may find a great case on the merits but must limit
its investment to the costs of the case. This is quite unlike the investment

31. Some have argued that the uncertainty of what might be uncovered in discovery can
justify even lawsuits that have a negative expected value when the case is filed. See Joseph A.
Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1277 (2006).
32. We have little systematic understanding of how summary judgment works in practice
and what factors determine outcomes. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Rethinking Summary Judgment
Empirics: The Life of the Parties, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1663 (2014).
33. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Litigating Toward Settlement, 29 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 898, 899 (2013) (“A single filed complaint may advance multiple, often competing,
theories, and causes of action.”).
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problem facing other investment managers. An investment manager who
decides that Google stock is a great investment can pretty much buy as much of
that stock as she wants. The same is true for an investment manager who wants
to own U.S. 30-year Treasury bonds or invest in oil and gas. Scale is not a
problem in such investments. The litigation funder, however, is more like a
small-business lender. Each case is its own small business and needs only a
certain amount of capital.
Second, not all good cases that need significant capital will present
themselves to the litigation funder. Litigation funding trades downside
protection—essentially, the possibility of losing the case while having borne the
costs of litigation—for a share of the upside in the litigation. Because the
funding must have a positive expected value for the litigation funder to take it,
the funding will have a negative expected value for the plaintiff if she and the
litigation funder agree on the merits (probability of victory) of the case. The
plaintiff will not take the negative expected value funding unless she is risk
averse or budget-constrained (that is, does not have the money to fund the
litigation herself). Moreover, a plaintiff who is budget-constrained will take
only the amount of financing necessary to overcome the budget constraint,
limiting the funder’s ability to scale his investment. If the plaintiff is optimistic
about her case relative to the litigation funder, this will only exacerbate her
unwillingness to accept unnecessary funding, because her optimism makes the
funding seem even more of a bad deal than when she is not optimistic. In other
words, a plaintiff who sees her litigation as highly likely to prevail will be more
reluctant to share a reward with a litigation funder.
Third, some of the cases that present themselves to the litigation funder will
not be good cases. Because litigation funders provide non-recourse financing, a
plaintiff can have some upside with little or no financial downside. A risk
neutral plaintiff who is pessimistic relative to the litigation funder will accept
funding even for a case that she perceives to have negative expected value. We
would expect funders (and investors placing money with funders) to be
especially cautious of funding litigants who are not budget constrained and who
are not plausibly risk averse for the amounts at stake in the investment.
C. The Problem of Optimism
Excessive optimism is a well-documented psychological bias. People
exhibit an optimism bias when they systematically overestimate the probability
of a good event and underestimate the probability of a bad event. The relevant
psychological literature presents two pervasive findings that make optimism an
interesting subject of study for corporate finance researchers. First, people are
more optimistic about outcomes they believe they can control. Second, people
are more optimistic about outcomes to which they are highly committed.
Litigation funding investments are likely to evoke optimism for both of these
reasons.
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While litigation funders may be realistic about the inherent uncertainties of
litigation, they may still believe they have, and will continue to have, substantial
control over the litigation. Their investment can be contingent on the
involvement of counsel of their choice. While they cannot dictate strategy to
the litigation team or make settlement decisions for the client, the possibility of
repeat business by the funded plaintiff’s lawyers can create some pressure to
take the funder’s view into account. At the start of the case, the funder may
also simply overestimate their ability to persuade the litigation team and client
to view the case as the funder does. Litigation funders are also likely to be
highly committed to the outcome of the case. Indeed, there is little else about
the litigation funding arrangement that matters as significantly as the financial
outcome.
Optimism is particularly problematic for litigation-funding investors
because optimism is likely to result in a winner’s curse outcome, similar to
bidders in corporate acquisitions. 34 The winner’s curse is the tendency for the
winner in an auction or bidding process to be the potential buyer who most
overvalues the asset being sold. 35 In this context, if several litigation funders
evaluate a potential cases, the litigation funder that funds the case—likely the
one who (1) agrees to fund the litigation and (2) offers the best terms to the
plaintiff—may be the litigation funder who most overvalued the case’s
potential. Here, the possible market inefficiencies for litigation investments can
come back to bite the investor. In a market for a publicly traded stock, some
investors’ ability to sell short (that is, borrow shares they do not own, sell them,
and hope to buy them back in the future at a lower price), can depress prices
that have been driven too high by investor optimism. 36 No such mechanism

34. See Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197 (1986);
Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597 (1989); J.B. Heaton,
Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33 (2002); Ulrike Malmendier &
Geoffrey A. Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction, 89 J.
FIN. ECON. 20 (2008).
35. See E.C. Capen, R.V. Clapp & W.M. Campbell, Competitive Bidding in High-Risk
Situations, 23 J. PETROLEUM TECH. 641 (1971); Max Bazerman & William F. Samuelson, I Won the
Auction but Don’t Want the Prize, 27 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 618 (1983); John H. Kagel & Dan Levin,
The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 894
(1986).
36. The classic explanation is that “without short selling the price of a security is raised if
there is divergence of opinion. A sufficient amount of short selling could increase the volume of the
security outstanding until its price was forced down to the average valuation of all investors.”
Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151, 1162 (1977).
There is substantial evidence that short selling is important to market pricing. See, e.g., Charles M.
Jones & Owen A. Lamont, Short-Sale Constraints and Stock Returns, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 207 (2002);
Karl B. Diether, Kuan-Hui Lee & Ingrid M. Werner, Short-Sale Strategies and Return
Predictability, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 575 (2009) (examining the extent and importance of short selling
in U.S. stocks); Pedro A.C. Saffi & Kari Sigurdsson, Price Efficiency and Short Selling, 24 REV.
FIN. STUD. 821 (2011) (examining the same for global stocks); Ekkehart Boehmer & Juan (Julie)
Wu, Short Selling and the Price Discovery Process, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 287 (2013) (documenting
the greater accuracy of stock prices when short sellers are active); Mahdi Nezafat, Mark Schroder &
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exists for litigation investments, so optimism is likely to result in a painful
winner’s curse in some, perhaps many, litigation investments.
D. Competition Without Comparative Advantage
Notions of perfect competition are as old as the field of economics. 37 In one
modern formulation, a perfectly competitive environment is one where “there
are perfect-substitute outside options: if a buyer or seller tries to press his
trading partner for more favorable terms of trade, the latter has recourse to a
perfect-substitute, alternative buyer or seller.” 38 Sellers of litigation funding are
likely to find themselves in near perfect competition with one another. Funding
is fungible. With so much capital drawn into the litigation funding business and
a limited number of good cases to choose from, litigation funders cannot hope
(for long) to extract returns much above a perfectly competitive level. Even if
large existing publicly traded litigation funders are to be believed in their oftenopaque financial reporting of excellent returns from investments, those returns
are likely to fall as funders compete with each other to put their capital to work.
The fungibility of litigation finance contrasts with, for example, private
equity and venture capital. Both private equity firms and venture capitalists
have substantial control rights in the companies where they invest. 39 This
makes it possible for private equity funds and venture capitalist funds to
distinguish themselves from competitors on dimensions other than the money
they provide. 40 Private equity managers promote their reputations for working
well with company management. 41 By contrast, litigation funders must remain
passive. 42 This passivity limits the ways that litigation funders can differentiate

Qinghai Wang, Short-Sale Constraints, Information Acquisition, and Asset Prices, 172 J. ECON.
THEORY 273 (2017) (presenting a model that short-sales constraints during financial crises increase
volatility and may not support prices).
37. See Joan Robinson, What is Perfect Competition?, 49 Q. J. ECON. 104 (1934).
38. Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy, Perfect Competition and the Creativity of the
Market, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 479, 481 (2001).
39. See Paul Gompers et al., What Do Private Equity Firms Say They Do?, 121 J. FIN. ECON.
449 (2016) (describing private equity governance of their portfolio companies); Steven N. Kaplan &
Per Strömberg, Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring, 91 AM.
ECON. REV. 426 (2001) (describing venture capitalist governance of their portfolio companies).
40. See Viral V. Acharya et al., Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from
Private Equity, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 368, 370 (2013) (suggesting that private equity firms differ in
their ability to add value at portfolio companies).
41. E.g., GTCR LLC, https://www.gtcr.com/the-leaders-strategy/, (“As a leading private
equity firm, GTCR pioneered The Leaders Strategy™—finding and partnering with management
leaders in core domains to identify, acquire and build market-leading companies through
transformational acquisitions and organic growth. This differentiated approach has stood at the core
of GTCR’s investment strategy for more than 35 years.”) (GLCR is a large Chicago-based private
equity firm).
42. E.g., Danielle Cutrona, Answers to Key Legal Finance Ethics Questions, LAW360 (July
16, 2019, 4:07 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1178103/answers-to-key-legal-financeethics-questions, (“Legal finance providers enter into carefully negotiated transactions with law
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themselves from one another other than by offering better financial terms to
those taking litigation finance.
IV. WILL LITIGATION FUNDING SURVIVE BAD RETURNS?
The primary social benefit of litigation funding is that it allows risk-averse
plaintiffs to pursue meritorious cases they would otherwise forego because of
their risk aversion and/or inability to fund the litigation. Most individuals are
risk averse. Risk aversion causes plaintiffs to act as if they are pessimistic
about cases when they are not, and this can allow defendants to avoid answering
for wrongdoing. Like a contingency fee arrangement, a non-recourse litigation
funding arrangement provides financing that allows a budget-constrained and/or
risk averse plaintiff to finance litigation that she would otherwise be either
unable or unwilling to pursue. The non-recourse nature of most litigationfunding allows a litigant to protect against the downside of a loss—primarily,
the inability to recover costs—by trading to the funder a portion of the gains
from a judgment or settlement.
Litigation funding is especially important in allowing meritorious cases to
move forward when litigants would otherwise be unable to bear the costs and
risks of vindicating their rights, especially against large corporations that have
the wherewithal to greatly outspend even wealthy individuals. If litigation
funding ultimately proves itself to be a poor investment class, will litigants then
be unable to pursue these meritorious cases?
There is good reason to believe that poor returns to litigation funders will
not drive investors out of the space. The best evidence supporting this belief
comes from experience with active investment management in publicly traded
stocks. Passive index funds have long outperformed active equity managers. 43
Accumulated evidence of underperformance by active managers has generated a
massive shift to passive investing, but many investors continue to chase the
promise that active management will outperform passive management. 44 The
firms and corporations represented by sophisticated counsel. Their agreements should explicitly
state that the legal financier neither controls nor will seek to control strategy, settlement or other
litigation-related decision-making, nor direct a counterparty to settle a case at all, or for a particular
amount. Nor should legal finance providers withhold contractually required funding for strategic
reasons: They are passive investors, and do not control the legal assets in which they invest. Those
decisions remain entirely with the client.”) Danielle Cutrona is director of global public policy for
Burford Capital LLC.
43. See, e.g., Daisy Maxey & Chris Dieterich, Indexes Beat Stock Pickers Even Over 15
Years, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/indexes-beat-stock-pickers-evenover-15-years-1492039859; Chris Newlands & Madison Marriage, 99% of Actively Managed US
Equity Funds Underperform, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/e139d940977d-11e6-a1dc-bdf38d484582.
44. See, e.g., Kate Beioley, US active funds suffer record $143bn ‘exodus’ in December,
FIN. TIMES, (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/4b863bbe-1a7a-11e9-9e64-d150b3105d21;
Chris Flood, Vanguard Retains Title as World’s Fastest-Growing Asset Manager, FIN. TIMES, (Jan.
4, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/4245e135-d719-311c-a9d2-d9a75ec8ac79; Attracta Mooney,
Passive Funds Grew 4.5 Times Faster Than Active in 2016, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2017),
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fact that so many investors continue to pursue active management in the face of
inferior performance suggests investors might do the same in the litigation
funding space.
In fact, not only have investors in publicly traded stocks been willing to
stick with active equity management despite underperformance, investors
generally have been willing to stick with stock investments despite the fact that
only a tiny amount of stocks do better than the risk-free rate over their lives as
listed companies. In pathbreaking work published in 2018, finance professor
Hendrik Bessembinder found reports that the majority of U.S.-listed common
stocks since 1926 returned (inclusive of dividends) less than the risk-free rate
(that is, the one-month Treasury bill) over their lives as listed companies, so that
just 4% of listed U.S. companies account for all of the gains of the U.S. stock
market from 1926 to 2016. 45 In follow-up work in 2019, Bessembinder and his
colleagues extended their results for 1990 to 2018 to other countries and found
similar results: a majority of both U.S. and non-U.S. stocks underperformed the
one-month U.S. treasury bill rate. 46 Despite these facts, investors stand ready,
willing, even eager, to invest in publicly traded stocks.
The willingness of investors to stick with active management and
investment in individual stocks despite bad past performance suggests that
investors will not be deterred from investing in litigation finance simply
because returns are not as high as expected.
V. CONCLUSION
Much criticism against litigation funding—that it will lead to frivolous
litigation 47 or deprive litigants of control over their cases—is unpersuasive.
Litigation funders must be highly selective about the cases they fund. Litigation
funding is nonrecourse funding (i.e., without guarantees or collateral), so
litigation funders get paid only from recoveries in the litigation. It is
economically irrational for litigation funders to fund frivolous litigation. Only
if litigation funders work to screen out unmeritorious cases are they likely to
earn a sufficient return on their incurred risk—losing cases typically results in a
total loss of investment.

https://www.ft.com/content/c4f6ee56-e48c-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a; Corrie Driebusch, Investors
Pulling More Money From Actively Managed U.S. Stock Funds, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-pulling-more-money-from-actively-managed-u-s-stockfunds-1452702638.
45. See Hendrik Bessembinder, Do Stocks Outperform Treasury Bills?, 129 J. FIN. ECON.
440, 441 (2018).
46. See Hendrik Bessembinder, Te-Feng Chen, Goeun Choi & K.C. John Wei, Do Global
Stocks Outperform US Treasury Bills (July 5, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3415739.
47. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Litigation Finance and the Problem of Frivolous
Litigation, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 195 (2014).

Fall 2019]

Litigation Funding

155

The real criticism of litigation funding is not that it inflicts damages on the
justice system or litigants. It is that, for most investors, litigation funding is
probably too good an investment to be true. Some funders will succeed, but
they are likely to be those founded by former litigators with true depth of
experience, not those with limited experience in law without deep relationships
to find and evaluate a significant deal flow of cases with a cold eye. Most
funders will probably deliver poor returns to their investors, and it is possible
the returns to the industry as a whole will be negative once all currently
committed capital has turned over. Most investors could take a lesson from
Odysseus. They can listen to the luring promises of low correlation and market
inefficiencies but they should remain firmly tied to the mast of their ship, avoid
the sirens’ temptation, and naviagte investments to safer waters. But there is
little reason to doubt that some will continue to fall for the siren song of
litigation funding. For society and the justice system, that may be a good thing.
***
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